🔗 Share this article Do Populist-Led Governments Inevitably Wreck the Economy? “Cambio, cambio.” Under the scorching heat, dozens of currency traders are selling American currency on Florida Street, a lively shopping street in Buenos Aires. Referred to as arbolitos (“small trees”), they are thriving ahead of the October 26 midterm elections in a nation accustomed to holding the greenback. “The optimal moment for purchasing is now,” states one arbolito, refusing to provide her name. “[The dollar] dropped slightly but it is a fake-out – it will rebound.” Like her, economists across the spectrum expect a devaluation of the Argentine peso once the election concludes. The president has imposed a limit on the currency to tame soaring price increases and now it is artificially high and reserves are depleted, causing Argentina’s economy stagnant as consumers turn to cheap imports. Ideal Conditions The nation is a very special case. Argentina has frequently been hit by sovereign defaults and financial turmoil and the electorate have been susceptible over the years to leftwing populism, in the form of the influential Peronism, and currently the president’s conservative populism. Milei epitomizes populist leadership: charismatic, iconoclastic, promising forceful measures to reclaim control of economic management from the establishment on behalf of ordinary citizens. These defining traits are shared by his political partner in the United States, as well as Nigel Farage, who presents himself as a pint-swilling people’s champion even though he is a public school-educated ex-finance professional. Until recent months, Milei’s approach – including widespread sell-offs and deep budget reductions – had earned praise from the IMF for helping to bring price rises in check. The programme shares similarities with that of Milei’s idol Margaret Thatcher, who also saw inflation as a monster to be slain, no matter the cost. But investors began losing confidence in Milei’s radical project in recent months following a poor performance in provincial elections and a series of corruption scandals. Solely large-scale financial intervention by the US has averted what looked set to become a major currency crisis. Contradictions The 2016 referendum in 2016 likely contained similar reasoning, and its leader, the former prime minister, dismissed concerns about economic detail with a bullish determination to enact public demand in the face of the establishment’s horror. Farage has so far committed few policies to paper except for a call for large-scale removals, that he later appeared to revise on the hoof. He aims to curb the Bank of England, perhaps even ditching its governor, the incumbent, with distrust toward traditional institutions as a central element of populist rhetoric. His tax and spending policies appear to be unsettled: wary of being accused of proposing reckless spending, he lately abandoned a pledge to make large tax cuts. His second-in-command, Richard Tice, said they would focus instead on reductions in government expenditure. The opposition hopes this stance will allow it to depict Farage as planning to bring back austerity – a point the chancellor has made repeatedly, contrasting it with her strategy of boosting public investment. An economics professor says there are contradictions in Farage’s economic programme, as it stands. “Reform is funded by very wealthy people calling for lower taxes and reduced rules, but also talking a lot about the grievances of ordinary workers and the decline in manufacturing employment,” he says. “There is a conflict there among wealthy supporters who want Thatcherism on steroids, and this narrative of restoring UK employment and reindustrialisation.” Holding on to Power Realistically, research indicates neither left nor right populists often perform poorly when faced with real-world challenges (although each charismatic individual promises distinct solutions). Recent research from a leading journal analysed the outcomes of dozens of populist leaders, from 1900 to 2020. The study revealed that on average, after 15 years, GDP per capita tends to be 10% lower in countries governed by populist leaders than in similar economies with more mainstream regimes. “Financial decline, decreasing macroeconomic stability and the decay of governance typically occur together under populist governments,” argue the researchers. Another intriguing finding from the study, though, is that even with their negative impacts, these leaders are often effective at holding on to power, remaining in power for a considerable time, compared with shorter tenures for mainstream politicians. Put simply, it is not clear that even when their policies fail, populists face immediate consequences at the ballot box. Like the Brexiters’ promise to regain sovereignty, their appeal extends past mundane economics. Yet returning to Buenos Aires, whether the government’s agenda fails or is kept on life support through foreign assistance, Argentina’s citizens are already bearing significant costs.